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Abstract
Recent advances in deep reinforcement learning (RL) have led to considerable
progress in many 2-player zero-sum games, such as Go, Poker and Starcraft. The
purely adversarial nature of such games allows for conceptually simple and prin-
cipled application of RL methods. However real-world settings are many-agent,
and agent interactions are complex mixtures of common-interest and competitive
aspects. We consider Diplomacy, a 7-player board game designed to accentuate
dilemmas resulting from many-agent interactions. It also features a large com-
binatorial action space and simultaneous moves, which are challenging for RL
algorithms. We propose a simple yet effective approximate best response operator,
designed to handle large combinatorial action spaces and simultaneous moves. We
also introduce a family of policy iteration methods that approximate fictitious play.
With these methods, we successfully apply RL to Diplomacy: we show that our
agents convincingly outperform the previous state-of-the-art, and game theoretic
equilibrium analysis shows that the new process yields consistent improvements.
1 Introduction
Artificial Intelligence methods have achieved exceptionally strong competitive play in board games
such as Go, Chess, Shogi [104, 106, 105], Hex [2], Poker [81, 17] and various video games [59, 80,
56, 90, 41, 116, 51, 14]. Despite the scale, complexity and variety of these domains, a common focus
in multi-agent environments is the class of 2-player (or 2-team) zero-sum games: “1 vs 1” contests.
There are several reasons: they are polynomial-time solvable, and solutions both grant worst-case
guarantees and are interchangeable, so agents can approximately solve them in advance [117, 118].
Further, in this case conceptually simple adaptations of reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms often
have theoretical guarantees. However, most problems of interest are not purely adversarial: e.g. route
planning around congestion, contract negotiations or interacting with clients all involve compromise
and consideration of how preferences of group members coincide and/or conflict. Even when agents
are self-interested, they may gain by coordinating and cooperating, so interacting among diverse
groups of agents requires complex reasoning about others’ goals and motivations.
We study Diplomacy [19], a 7-player board game. The game was specifically designed to emphasize
tensions between competition and cooperation, so it is particularly well-suited to the study of learning
in mixed-motive settings. The game is played on a map of Europe partitioned into provinces. Each
player controls multiple units, and each turn all players move all their units simultaneously. One unit
may support another unit (owned by the same or another player), allowing it to overcome resistance
by other units. Due to the inter-dependencies between units, players must coordinate the moves of
their own units, and stand to gain by coordinating their moves with those of other players. Figure 1
depicts interactions among several players (moving and supporting units to/from provinces); we
explain the basic rules in Section 2.1. The original game allows cheap-talk negotiation between
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players before every turn. In this paper we focus on learning strategic interactions in a many-agent
setting, so we consider the popular No Press variant, where no explicit communication is allowed.
Figure 1: Simple exam-
ple of interactions be-
tween several players’
moves.
Diplomacy is particularly challenging for RL agents. First, it is a many-
player (n > 2) game, so methods cannot rely on the simplifying properties
of 2-player zero-sum games. Second, it features simultaneous moves, with
a player choosing an action without knowledge of the actions chosen by
others, which highlights reasoning about opponent strategies. Finally,
Diplomacy has a large combinatorial action space, with an estimated
game-tree size of 10900, and 1021 to 1064 legal joint actions per turn. ∗
Consequently, although Diplomacy AI has been studied since the 1980s [61,
63], until recently progress has relied on handcrafted rule-based systems,
rather than learning. Paquette et al. [86] achieved a major breakthrough:
they collected a dataset of ∼ 150, 000 human Diplomacy games, and
trained an agent, DipNet, using a graph neural network (GNN) to imitate
the moves in this dataset. This agent defeated previous state-of-the-art
agents conclusively and by a wide margin. This is promising, as imitation
learning can often be a useful starting point for RL methods.
However, to date RL has not been successfully applied to Diplomacy. For example, Paquette et al. [86]
used A2C initialised by their imitation learning agent, but this process did not improve performance as
measured by the Trueskill rating system [46]. This is unfortunate, as without agents able to optimise
their incentives, we cannot study the effects of mixed-motives on many-agent learning dynamics, or
how RL agents might account for other agents’ incentives (e.g. with Opponent Shaping [34]).
Our Contribution: We train RL agents to play No-Press Diplomacy, using a policy iteration (PI)
approach. We propose a simple yet scalable improvement operator, Sampled Best Responses (SBR),
which effectively handles Diplomacy’s large combinatorial action space and simultaneous moves.
We introduce versions of PI that approximate iterated best response and fictitious play (FP) [16, 93]
methods. In Diplomacy, we show that our agents outperform the previous state-of-the-art both against
reference populations and head-to-head. A game theoretic equilibrium analysis shows our process
yields consistent improvements. We propose a few-shot exploitability metric, which our RL reduces,
but agents remain fairly exploitable. We perform a case-study of our methods in a simpler game,
Blotto (Appendix A), and prove convergence results on FP in many-player games (Appendix H).
2 Background and Related Work
Game-playing has driven AI research since its inception: work on games delivered progress in search,
RL and computing equilibria [97, 40, 57, 33, 13, 95, 98, 111, 100, 39, 32] leading to prominent
successes in Chess [20], Go [104, 106], Poker [81, 17], multi-agent control domains [10, 75, 6, 108,
120] and video games [59, 80, 56]. Recent work has also used deep RL in many-player games.
Some, such as Soccer, Dota and Capture-the-Flag, focus on two teams engaged in a zero-sum game
but are cooperative between members of a team [75, 14, 51]. Others, e.g. Hanabi or Overcooked,
are fully-cooperative [35, 49, 71, 11, 21]. Most relevantly, some work covers mixed-motive social
dilemmas, with both competitive and collaborative elements [77, 70, 72, 23, 34, 101, 50].
There is little work on large, competitive, many-player settings, known to be harder than their two-
player counterparts [22, 25]. The exception is a remarkable recent success in many-player no-limit
Poker that defeated human experts [18]. However, it uses expert abstractions and end-game solving
to reduce the game tree size. Moreover, in Poker players often fold early in the game, until only
two players remain and collusion is strictly prohibited, which reduces the effects of many-player
interactions in practice. In contrast, in Diplomacy 2-player situations are rare and alliances are crucial.
Diplomacy AI Research: Diplomacy is a long-standing AI challenge. Even in the simpler No-
Press variant, AIs are far weaker than human players. Rule-based Diplomacy agents were proposed
in the 1980s and 1990s [61, 42, 60, 62]. Frameworks such as DAIDE [94] DipGame [30] and
BANDANA [53] promoted development of stronger rule-based agents [52, 113, 31]. One work
applied TD-learning with pattern weights [102], but was unable to produce a strong agent. Negotiation
∗For comparison, Chess’s game tree size is 10123, it has 1047 states, and fewer than 100 legal actions per
turn. Estimates for Diplomacy are based on human data; see Appendix I for details.
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for Computer Diplomacy is part of the Automated Negotiating Agents Competition [5, 26]. We
build on DipNet, the recent success in using a graph neural network to imitate human gameplay [86].
DipNet outperformed previous agents, all rule-based systems, by a large margin. However, the
authors found that A2C [79] did not significantly improve DipNet. We replicated this result with our
improved network architecture (see Appendix E).
2.1 No-Press Diplomacy: Summary of Game Rules
We provide an intentionally brief overview of the core game mechanics. For a longer introduction,
see [86], and the rulebook [19]. The board is a map of Europe partitioned into provinces; 34 provinces
are supply centers (SCs, dots in PAR, MUN, MAR, and VEN in Figure 1). Each player controls
multiple units of a country. Units capture SCs by occupying the province. Owning more SCs allows
a player to build more units; the game is won by owning a majority of the SCs. Diplomacy has
simultaneous moves: each turn every player writes down orders for all their units, without knowing
what other players will do; players then reveal their moves, which are executed simultaneously. The
next position is fully determined by the moves and game rules, with no chance element (e.g. dice).
Only one unit can occupy a province, and all units have equal strength. A unit may hold (guard its
province) or move to an adjacent province. A unit may also support an adjacent unit to hold or move,
to overcome opposition by enemy units. Using Figure 1 as a running example, suppose France orders
move PAR→ BUR; if the unit in MUN holds then the unit in PAR enters BUR, but if Germany
also ordered MUN→ BUR, both units ‘bounce’ and neither enters BUR. If France wanted to insist
on entering to BUR, they can order MAR support PAR→ BUR, which gives France 2 units versus
Germany’s 1, so France’s move order would succeed and Germany’s would not. However, MAR’s
support can be cut by Italy moving PIE→ MAR, leading to an equal-strength bounce as before.
This example highlights elements that make Diplomacy unique and challenging. Due to simultaneous
move resolution, players must anticipate how others will act and reflect these expectations in their
own actions. Players must also use a stochastic policy (mixed strategy), as otherwise opponents could
exploit their determinism. Finally, cooperation is essential: Germany would not have been able to
prevent France from moving to BUR without Italy’s help. Diplomacy is specifically designed so
that no player can win on their own without help from other players, so players must form alliances
to achieve their ultimate goal. In the No-Press variant, this causes pairwise interactions that differ
substantially from zero-sum, so difficulties associated with mixed-motive games arise in practice.
3 Reinforcement Learning Methods
We adopt a policy iteration (PI) based approach, motivated by successes using PI for perfect informa-
tion, sequential move, 2-player zero-sum board games [2, 105]. We maintain a neural network policy
pˆi and a value function Vˆ . Each iteration we create a dataset of games, with actions chosen by an
improvement operator which uses a previous policy and value function to find a policy that defeats
the previous policy. We then train our policy and value functions to predict the actions chosen by the
improvement operator and the game results. The initial policy pˆi0 and value function Vˆ 0 imitate the
human play dataset, similarly to DipNet [86], providing a stronger starting point for learning.
Section 3.1 describes SBR, our best response approximation method, tailored to handle the simulta-
neous move and combinatorial action space of Diplomacy. Section 3.2 describes versions of PI that
use SBR to approximate iterated best response and fictitious play algorithms. Our neural network
training is an improved version of DipNet, described in Section 3.3 and Appendix C.
3.1 Sampled Best Response
Our PI methods use best response (BR) calculations as an improvement operator. Given a policy pib
defined for all players, the BR for player i is the policy pi∗i that maximises the expected return for
player i against the opponent policies pib−i. A best response may not be a good policy to play as it can
be arbitrarily poor against policies other than those it responds to. Nonetheless best responses are a
useful tool, and we address convergence to equilibrium with the way we use BRs in PI (Section 3.2).
Diplomacy is far too large for exact best response calculation, so we propose a tractable approximation,
Sampled Best Response (SBR, Algorithm 1). SBR makes three approximations: (1) we consider
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making a single-turn improvement to the policy in each state, rather than a full calculation over
multiple turns of the game. (2) We only consider taking a small set of actions, sampled from a
candidate policy. (3) We use Monte-Carlo estimates over opponent actions for candidate evaluation.
Consider calculating the value of some action ai for player i against an opponent policy pib−i (hereafter
the base policy). Let T (s,a) be the transition function of the game and V pi(s) be the state-value
function for a policy pi. The 1-turn value to player i of action ai in state s is given by:
Qpi
b
i (ai|s) = Ea−i∼pib−iV
pib
i (T (s, (ai, a−i)))
We use the value network Vˆ instead of the exact state-value to get an estimated action-value Qˆpi
b
i (ai|s).
If the action space were small enough, we could exactly calculate arg maxai Qˆ
pibi (ai|s), as a 1-turn
best response. However, there are far too many actions to consider all of them. Instead, we sample a
set of candidate actions Ai from a candidate policy pici(s), and only consider these candidates for our
approximate best response. Now the strength of the SBR policy depends on the candidate policy’s
strength, as we calculate an improvement compared to pici in optimizing the 1-turn value estimate.
Note we can use a different policy pic to the policy pib we are responding to.
The number of strategies available to opponents is also too large, so calculating the 1-turn value of
any candidate is intractable. We therefore use Monte-Carlo sampling. Values are often affected by
the decisions of other players; to reduce variance we use common random numbers when sampling
opponent actions: we evaluate all candidates with the same opponent actions (base profiles). SBR
can be seen as finding a BR to the sampled base profiles, which approximate the opponent policies.
3.2 Best Response Policy Iteration
We present a family of PI approaches tailored to using (approximate) BRs, such as SBR, in a many-
agent game; we refer to them collectively as Best Response Policy Iteration (BRPI) algorithms
(Algorithm 2). SBR depends on the pib, pic, v (base policy, candidate policy and value function); we
can use historical network checkpoints for these. Different choices give different BRPI algorithms.
The simplest version is standard PI with BRs, while others BRPI variants approximate fictitious play.
In the most basic BRPI approach, every iteration t we apply SBR to the latest policy pˆit−1 and value
Vˆ t−1 to obtain an improved policy pi′ (i.e. SBR(pic = pˆit−1, pib = pˆit−1, v = Vˆ t−1)). We then
sample trajectories of self-play with pi′ to create a dataset, to which we fit a new policy pˆit and value
Vˆ t using the same techniques used to imitate human data (supervised learning with a GNN). We refer
to this as Iterated Best Response (IBR). IBR is akin to applying standard single-agent PI methods in
self-play, a popular approach for perfect information, 2-player zero-sum games [109, 99, 105, 2].
However, iteration through exact best responses may behave poorly, failing to converge and leading
to cycling among strategies. Further, in a game with simultaneous moves, deterministic play is
undesirable, and best responses are typically deterministic. As a potential remedy, we consider PI
algorithms based on Fictitious Play (FP) [16, 112, 73, 44]. In FP, at each iteration all players best
respond to the empirical distribution over historical opponent strategies. In 2-player zero-sum, the
time average of players’ strategies converges to a Nash Equilibrium [16, 93]. In Appendix H, we
review theory on many-agent FP, and prove that continuous-time FP converges to a coarse correlated
equilibrium in many-agent games. This motivates approximating FP with a BRPI algorithm. We now
provide two versions of Fictitious Play Policy Iteration (FPPI) that do this.
The first method, FPPI-1, is akin to NFSP [45]. At iteration t, we aim to train our policy and value
networks pˆit, Vˆ t to approximate the time-average of BRs (rather than the latest BR). With such a
network, to calculate the BR at time t, we need an approximate best response to the latest policy
network (which is the time-average policy), so use SBR(pib = pˆit−1, v = Vˆ t−1). Hence, to train the
network to produce the average of BRs so far, at the start of each game we uniformly sample an
iteration d ∈ {0, 1, . . . , t − 1}; if we sample d = t − 1 we use the latest BR, and if d < t − 1 we
play a game with the historical checkpoints to produce the historical BR policy from iteration d. †
FPPI-1 has some drawbacks. With multiple opponents, the empirical distribution of opponent
strategies does not factorize into the empirical distributions for each player. But a standard policy
†A similar effect could be achieved with a DAgger-like procedure [96], or reservoir sampling [45].
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Algorithm 1 Sampled Best Response
Require: Policies pib, pic, value function v
1: function SBR(s:state, i:player)
2: for j ← 1 to B do
3: bj ∼ pib−i(s) . Sample Base Profile
4: for j ← 1 to C do
5: cj ∼ pici (s) . Candidate Action
6: Qˆ(cj)← 1B
∑B
k=1 v(T (s, (cj , bk)))
7: return arg maxc∈{cj}Cj=1 Qˆ(c)
Algorithm 2 Best Response Policy Iteration
Require: Best Response Operator BR
1: function BRPI(pi0(θ), v0(θ))
2: for t← 1 to N do
3: piimp ← BR({pij}t−1j=0, {vj}t−1j=0)
4: D ← Sample-Trajectories(piimp)
5: pii(θ)← Learn-Policy(D)
6: vi(θ)← Learn-Value(D)
7: return piN , vN
network only predicts the per-player marginals, rather than the full joint distribution, which weakens
the connection to FP. Also, our best response operator’s strength is affected by the strength of the
candidate policy and the value function. But FPPI-1 continues to imitate old and possibly weaker
best responses, even after we have trained stronger policies and value functions.
In our second variant, FPPI-2, we train the policy networks to predict only the latest BR, and
explicitly average historical checkpoints to provide the empirical strategy so far. The empirical
opponent strategy up to time t is µt := 1t
∑
d<t pi
d
−i, to draw from this distribution we first sample
a historical checkpoint d < t, and then sample actions for all players using the same checkpoint.
Player i’s strategy at time t should be an approximate best response to this strategy, and the next
policy network pit imitates that best response. In SBR, this means we use pib = µt as the base policy.
This remedies the drawbacks of the first approach. The correlations in opponent strategies are
preserved because we sample from the same checkpoint for all opponents. More importantly, we
no longer reconstruct any historical BRs, so can use our best networks for the candidate policy and
value function in SBR, independently of which checkpoints are sampled to produce base profiles.
For example, using the latest networks for the candidate policy and value function, while uniformly
sampling checkpoints for base profiles, could find stronger best responses while still approximating FP.
However, FPPI-2’s final time-averaged policy is represented by a mixture over multiple checkpoints.
These variants suggest a design space of algorithms combining SBR with PI. (1) The base policy can
either be the latest policy (an IBR method), or from a uniformly sampled previous checkpoint (an
FP method). (2) We can also use either the latest or a uniformly sampled previous value function.
(3) The candidate policy both acts as a regulariser on the next policy and drives exploration, so we
consider several options: using the initial (human imitation) policy, using the latest policy, or using a
uniformly sampled checkpoint; we also consider mixed strategies: taking half the candidates from
initial and half from latest, or taking half from initial and half from a uniformly sampled checkpoint.
Appendix A is a case study analysing how SBR and our BRPI methods perform in a many-agent
version of the Colonel Blotto game [15]. Blotto is small enough that exact BRs can be calculated,
so we can investigate how exact FP and IBR perform in these games, how using SBR with various
parameters affects tabular FP, and how different candidate policy and base policy choices affect a
model of BRPI with function approximation. We find that: (1) exact IBR is ineffective in Blotto; (2)
stochastic best responses in general, and SBR in particular, improve convergence rates for FP; (3)
using SBR dramatically improves the behaviour of IBR methods compared to exact BRs.
3.3 Neural Architecture
Our network is based on the imitation learning of DipNet [86], which uses an encoder GNN to embed
each province, and a LSTM decoder to output unit moves (see DipNet paper for details). We make
several improvements, described briefly here, and fully in Appendix C. (1) We use the board features
of DipNet, but replace the original ‘alliance features’ with the board state at the last moves phase,
combined with learned embeddings of all actions taken since that phase. (2) In the encoder, we
removed the FiLM layer, and added node features to the existing edge features of the GNN. (3) Our
decoder uses a GNN relational order decoder rather than an LSTM. These changes increase prediction
accuracy by 4− 5% on our validation set (data splits and performance comparison in Appendix C).
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4 Evaluation Methods
We analyze our agents through multiple lenses: We measure winrates (1) head-to-head between agents
from different algorithms and (2) against fixed populations of reference agents. (3) We consider
‘meta-games’ between checkpoints of one training run to test for consistent improvement. (4) We
examine the exploitability of agents from different algorithms. Results of each analysis are in the
corresponding part of Section 5.
Head-to-head comparison: We play 1v6 games between final agents of different BRPI variants
and other baselines to directly compare their performance. This comparison also allows us to spot
if interactions between pairs of agents give unusual results. From an evolutionary game theory
perspective, 1v6 winrates indicate whether a population of agents can be ‘invaded’ by a different
agent, and hence whether they constitute Evolutionary Stable Strategies (ESS) [110, 107]. ESS have
been important in the study of cooperation, as a conditionally cooperative strategies such as Tit-for-Tat
can be less prone to invasion than purely co-operative or mostly non-cooperative strategies [4].
Winrate Against a Population: We assess how well an agent performs against a reference population.
An agent to be evaluated plays against 6 players independently drawn from the reference population,
with the country it plays as chosen at random each game. We report the average score of the agent,
and refer to this as a “1v6” match. ‡ This mirrors how people play the game: each player only ever
represents a single agent, and wants to maximize their score against a population of other people.
We consider two reference populations: (a) only the DipNet agent [86], the previous state-of-the-art
method, which imitates and hence is a proxy for human play. (b) a uniform mixture of 15 final RL
agents, each from a different BRPI method (see Appendix B); BRPI agents are substantially stronger
than DipNet, and the mixture promotes opponent diversity.
Policy Transitivity: Policy intransitivity relates to an improvement dynamics that cycles through
policy space, rather than yielding a consistent improvement in the quality of the agents [48, 9], which
can occur because multiple agents all optimize different objectives. We assess policy transitivity with
meta-games between the checkpoints of a training run. In the meta-game, instead of playing yourself,
you elect an ‘AI champion’ to play on your behalf, and achieve the score of your chosen champion.
Each of the seven players may select a champion from among the same set of N pre-trained policies.
We randomize the country each player plays, so the meta-game is a symmetric, zero-sum, 7-player
game. If training is transitive, choosing later policies will perform better in the meta-game.
Game theory recommends selecting a champion by sampling one of the N champions according
to a Nash equilibrium [83], with bounded rationality modelled by a Quantal Response Equilibrium
(QRE) [78]. Champions can be ranked according to their probability mass in the equilibrium [9]. §
We calculate a QRE (see Appendix G) of the meta-game consisting of i early checkpoints, and see
how it changes as later checkpoints are added. In transitive runs we expect the distribution of the
equilibrium to be biased towards later checkpoints.
Finding a Nash equilibrium of the meta-game is computationally hard (PPAD-complete) [85], so as
an alternative, we consider a simplified 2-player meta-game, where the row player’s agent plays for
one country, and the other player’s agent plays in the other 6, we call this the ‘1v6 meta-game’. We
report heatmaps of the payoff table, where the row and column strategies are sorted chronologically.
If training is transitive, the row payoff increases as row index increases but decreases as the column
index increases, which is visually distinctive [8].
Exploitability: The exploitability of a policy pi is the margin by which an adversary (i.e. BR) to
pi would defeat a population of agents playing pi; it has been a key metric for Poker agents [74].
As SBR approximates a BR to its base policy, it can be used to lower bound the base policy’s
exploitability, measured by the average score of 1 SBR agent against 6 copies of pi. The strongest
exploit we found mixes the human imitation policy and pi for candidates, and uses pi’s value function,
i.e. SBR(pic = piSL + pi, pib = pi, v = V pi). People can exploit previous Diplomacy AIs after
only a few games, so few-shot exploitability may measure progress towards human-level No-Press
Diplomacy agents. If we use a ‘neutral’ policy and value function, and only a few base profiles, SBR
acts as a few-shot measure of exploitability. To do this we use the human imitation policy piSL for
candidates, and - because V SL is too weak - a value function from an independent BRPI run V RL.
‡The score is 1 for a win, 1
n
for n players surviving at a timeout of ∼ 80 game-years, and 0 otherwise.
§A similar analysis called a ‘Nash League’ was used to study Starcraft agents [115].
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5 Results
We analyse three BRPI algorithms: IBR, FPPI-1 and FPPI-2, defined in Section 3.2. In FPPI-2 we
use the latest value function. We sample candidates with a mixture taking half the candidates from the
initial policy. The other half for IBR and FPPI-2 is from iteration t− 1; for FPPI-1 it comes from the
uniformly sampled iteration. At test time, we run all networks at a softmax temperature t = 0.1. ¶
Head-to-head comparison: we compare our methods to the supervised learning (SL) and RL (A2C)
DipNet agents [86] and our SL implementation, with our neural architecture (see Appendix B for
additional comparisons). Table 1 shows the average 1v6 score where a single row agent plays against
6 column agents. For the BRPI methods, these are averaged over 5 seeds of each run. All of our
learning methods give a large improvement over both supervised learning baselines, and an even
larger winrate over DipNet A2C. Among our learning methods, FPPI-2 achieves the best winrate in
1v6 against each algorithm, and is also the strategy against which all singleton agents do the worst. ‖
SL [86] A2C [86] SL (ours) FPPI-1 IBR FPPI-2
SL [86] 14.2% 8.3% 16.3% 2.3% 1.8% 0.8%
A2C [86] 15.1% 14.2% 15.3% 2.3% 1.7% 0.9%
SL (ours) 12.6% 7.7% 14.1% 3.0% 1.9% 1.1%
FPPI-1 26.4% 28.0% 25.9% 14.4% 7.4% 4.5%
IBR 20.7% 30.5% 25.8% 20.3% 12.9% 10.9%
FPPI-2 19.4% 32.5% 20.8% 22.4% 13.8% 12.7%
Table 1: Average scores for 1 row player vs 6 column players. BRPI methods give an improvement
over A2C or supervised learning. All numbers accurate to a 95% confidence interval of ±0.5%. Bold
numbers are the best value for single agents against a given set of 6 agents, italics are for the best
result for a set of 6-agents against each single agent.
Winrate Against a Population: The left of Figure 2 shows the performance of our BRPI methods
against DipNet through training. Solid lines are the winrate of our agents in 1v6 games (1 BRPI
agent vs. 6 DipNet agents), and dashed lines relate to the winrate of DipNet reverse games (1 DipNet
agent vs 6 PI agents). The x-axis shows the number of policy iterations. A dashed black line indicates
a winrate of 1/7th (expected for identical agents as there are 7 players). The figure shows that all
PI methods quickly beat the DipNet baseline before plateauing. Meanwhile, the DipNet winrate
drops close to zero in the reverse games. The figure on the right is identical, except the baseline is
a uniform mixture of our final agents from BRPI methods. Against this population, our algorithms
do not plateau, instead improving steadily through training. The figure shows that FPPI-1 tends to
under-perform against our other BRPI methods (FPPI-2 and IBR). We averaged 5 different runs with
different random seeds, and display 90% confidence intervals with shaded area.
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Figure 2: Winrates through training, 1v6 or 6v1 against different reference populations
¶If accepted for publication, we will open-source these BRPI agents and our SL agent for benchmarking.
‖Note that the diagonal entries of this table involve agents playing against different agents trained using the
same algorithm. This means that they are not necessarily equal to 1/7.
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Figure 3: Transitivity Meta-Games: Top: IBR, Bottom: FPPI-2. Left: 1v6, Right: QRE in 7-player.
Policy Transitivity: Figure 3 depicts the Diplomacy meta-game between checkpoints produced in a
single BRPI run. The heatmaps on the left examine a 1v6 meta game, showing the winrate of one row
checkpoint playing against 6 column checkpoints for even numbered checkpoints through the run.
The plots show that nearly every checkpoint beats all the previous checkpoints in terms of 1v6 winrate.
A checkpoint may beat its predecessors in way that’s exploitable by other strategies: checkpoint 4 in
the FPPI-2 run beats the previous checkpoints, but is beaten by all subsequent checkpoints by a larger
margin than previous checkpoints.
The right side of Figure 3 shows the Nash-league of the full meta-game. The ith row shows the
distribution of a QRE in the meta-game over the first i checkpoints analyzed (every row adds the
next checkpoint). We consider checkpoints spaced exponentially through training, as gains to further
training diminish with time. The figure shows that the QRE consistently places most of the mass
on the recent checkpoint, indicating a consistent improvement in the quality of strategies, rather
than cycling between different specialized strategies. This is particularly notable for IBR: every
checkpoint is only trained to beat the previous one, yet we still observe transitive improvements
during the run (consistent with our positive findings for IBR in Blotto in Appendix A.5.3).
Exploitability: We find that all our agents are fairly exploitable at the end of training (e.g. the
strongest exploiters achieve a 48% winrate), and the strongest exploit found does not change much
through training, but few-shot exploitability is reduced through training. Agents are more exploitable
at low temperatures, suggesting our agents usefully mix strategies. Final training targets are less
exploitable than final networks, including in IBR, unlike what we’d expect if we used an exact BR
operator, which would yield a highly exploitable deterministic policy. For full details see Appendix B.
6 Conclusion
We proposed a novel approach for training RL agents in Diplomacy with BRPI methods and overcom-
ing the simultaneous moves and large combinatorial action space using our simple yet effective SBR
improvement operator. We showed that the stochasticity of SBR was beneficial to BRPI algorithms in
Blotto. We set-out a thorough analysis process for Diplomacy agents. Our methods improve over the
state of the art, yielding a consistent improvement of the agent policy. IBR was surprisingly effective,
but our strongest method was FPPI-2, a new approach to combining RL with fictitious play.
Using RL to improve game-play in No-press Diplomacy is a prerequisite for investigating the complex
mixed motives and many-player aspects of this game. Future work can now focus on questions like:
(1) What is needed to achieve human-level No-Press Diplomacy AI? (2) How can the exploitability
of RL agents be reduced? (3) Can we build agents that reason about the incentives of others, for
example behaving in a reciprocal manner [28], or by applying opponent shaping [34]? (4) How can
agents learn to use signalling actions to communicate intentions in No-Press Diplomacy? (5) Finally,
how can agents handle negotiation in Press variants of the game, where communication is allowed?
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Broader Impact
We discuss the potential impact of our work, examining possible positive and negative societal impact.
What is special about Diplomacy? Diplomacy [19] has simple rules but high emergent complexity.
It was designed to accentuate dilemmas relating to building alliances, negotiation and teamwork
in the face of uncertainty about other agents. The tactical elements of Diplomacy form a difficult
environment for AI algorithms: the game is played by seven players, it applies simultaneous moves,
and has a very large combinatorial action space.
What societal impact might it have? We distinguish immediate societal impact arising from the
availability of the new training algorithm, and indirect societal impact due to the future work on
many-agent strategic decision making enabled or inspired by this work.
Immediate Impact. Our methods allow training agents in Diplomacy and other temporally extended
environments where players take simultaneous actions, and the action of a player can be decomposed
into multiple sub-actions, in domains that can can be simulated well, but in which learning has been
difficult so far. Beyond the direct impact on Diplomacy, possible applications of our method include
business, economic, and logistics domains, in as far as the scenario can be simulated sufficiently
accurately. Examples include games that require a participant to control multiple units (Starcraft
and Dota [115, 14] have this structure, but there are many more), controlling fleets of cars or
robots [1, 89, 114] or sequential resource allocation [91, 87]. However, applications such as in
business or logistics are hard to capture realistically with a simulator, so significant additional work is
needed to apply this technology in real-world domains involving multi-agent learning and planning.
While Diplomacy is themed as a game of strategy where players control armies trying to gain control
of provinces, it is a very abstract game - not unlike Chess or Checkers. It seems unlikely that real-
world scenarios could be successfully reduced to the level of abstraction of a game like Diplomacy.
In particular, our current algorithms assume a known rule set and perfect information between turns,
whereas the real world would require planning algorithms that can manage uncertainty robustly.
Future Impact. In providing the capability of training a tactical baseline agent for Diplomacy or
similar games, this work also paves the way for research into agents that are capable of forming
alliances and use more advanced communication abilities, either with other machines or with humans.
In Diplomacy and related games this may lead to more interesting AI partners to play with. More
generally, this line of work may inspire further work on problems of cooperation. We believe that a
key skill for a Diplomacy player is to ensure that, wherever possible, their pairwise interactions with
other players are positive sum. AIs able to play Diplomacy at human level must be able to achieve
this in spite of the incentive to unilaterally exploit trust established with other agents.
More long term, this work may pave the way towards research into agents that play the full version
of the game of Diplomacy, which includes communication. In this version, communication is used
to broker deals and form alliances, but also to misrepresent situations and intentions. For example,
agents may learn to establish trust, but might also exploit that trust to mislead their co-players and
gain the upper hand. In this sense, this work may facilitate the development of manipulative agents
that use false communication as a means to achieve their goals. To mitigate this risk, we propose
using games like Diplomacy to study the emergence and detection of manipulative behaviours in a
sandbox — to make sure that we know how to mitigate such behaviours in real-world applications.
Overall, our work provides an algorithmic building block for finding good strategies in many-agent
systems. While prior work has shown that the default behaviour of independent reinforcement
learning agents can be non-cooperative [70, 34, 50], we believe research on Diplomacy could pave the
way towards creating artificial agents that can successfully cooperate with others, including handling
difficult questions that arise around establishing and maintaining trust and alliances.
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Appendix
A Case Study: Many-Player Colonel Blotto
Our improvement operator for Diplomacy is SBR, described in Section 3.1. Diplomacy is a complex
environment, where training requires significant time. To analyze the impact of applying SBR as
an improvement operator, we use the much simpler normal-form game called the Colonel Blotto
game [15] as an evaluation environment. We use the Blotto environment to examine several variants
of best response policy iteration. We run these experiments using OpenSpiel [68] and will contribute
the code to reproduce these results if accepted for publication.
Colonel Blotto is a famous game theoretic setting proposed about a century ago. It has a very large
action space, and although its rules are short and simple, it has a high emergent complexity [92]. The
original game has only two players, but we describe an n-player variant, Blotto(n, c, f): each player
has c coins to be distributed across f fields. The aim is to win the most fields. Each player takes a
single action simultaneously and the game ends. The action is an allocation of the player’s coins
across the fields: the player decides how many of its c coins to put in each of the fields, choosing
c1, c2, . . . , cf where
∑f
i=1 ci = c. For example, with c = 10 coins and f = 3 fields, one valid action
is [7, 2, 1], interpreted as 7 coins on the first field, 2 on the second, and 1 on the third. A field is won
by the player contributing the most coins to that field (and drawn if there is a tie for the most coins).
The winner receives a reward or +1 (or a +1 is shared among all players with the most fields in the
case of a tie), and the losers share a -1, and all player receive 0 in the case of a n-way tie.
We based our analysis on Blotto for several reasons. First, like Diplomacy, it has the property that the
action space grows combinatorially as the game parameter values increase. Second, Blotto is a game
where the simultaneous-move nature of the game matters, so players have to employ mixed strategies,
which is a difficult case for standard RL and best response algorithms. Third, it has been used in a
number of empirical studies to analyze the behavior of human play [3, 58]. Finally, Blotto is small
enough that distances to various equilibria can be computed exactly, showing the effect each setting
has on the empirical convergence rates.
Blotto differs to Diplomacy in several ways. The Nash equilibrium in Blotto tends to cover a
substantial proportion of the strategy space, whereas in Diplomacy, many of the available actions are
weak, so finding good actions is more of a needle-in-a-haystack problem. In many-agent Blotto, it is
difficult for an agent to target any particular opponent with an action, whereas in Diplomacy most
attacks are targeted against a specific opponent. Finally, Blotto is a single-turn (i.e. normal form)
game, so value functions are not needed. Throughout this section, we use the exact game payoff
wherever the value function would be needed in Diplomacy.
A.1 Definitions and Notation Regarding Equilibria
We now provide definitions and notation regarding various forms of equilibria in games, which we
use in other appendices also.
Consider an N -player game where players take actions in a set {Ai}i∈{1,...,N}. The reward for player
i under a profile a = {a1, . . . , aN} of actions is ri(a1, . . . , aN ).
Each player uses a policy {pii}i∈{1,...,N} which is a distribution over action Ai.
We use the following notation:
ripi = E∀i,ai∼pii(.)
[
ri(a1, . . . , aN )
]
ripi−i = E∀j 6=i,aj∼pij(.)
[
ri(a1, . . . , aN )
]
Nash equilibrium: A Nash equilibrium is strategy profile (x1, . . . , xN ) such that no player i can
improve their win rate by unilaterally deviating from their sampling distribution xi (with all other
player distributions, x−i, held fixed). Formally, a Nash equilibrium is a policy pi = {pi1, . . . , piN}
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such that:
∀i,max
pi′i
〈pi′i, ripi−i〉 = ripi
-Nash: An -Nash is a strategy profile such that the most a player can improve their win rate by
unilaterally deviating is :
Lexpi(x) = maxz {r
i(z, x−i)} − ri(xi, x−i) ≤  (1)
where ri is player i’s reward given all player strategies.
The NashConv metric, defined in [69], has a value of 0 at a Nash equilibrium and can be interpreted
as a distance from Nash. It is the sum of over players of how much each player can improve their
winrate with a unilateral deviation.
Coarse Correlated Equilibrium: The notion of a Coarse Correlated Equilibrium [82] relates to a
joint strategy pi(a1, . . . , aN ), which might not factorize into independent per-player strategies. A
joint strategy pi(a1, . . . , aN ) is a Coarse Correlated Equilibrium if for all player i:
max
a′i
Ea1,...,aN∼pi [r(a
′
i, a−i)]− Ea1,...,aN∼pi [r(a1, . . . , aN )] ≤ 0
A joint strategy pi(a1, . . . , aN ) is a -Coarse Correlated Equilibrium if for all player i:
max
a′i
Ea1,...,aN∼pi [r(a
′
i, a−i)]− Ea1,...,aN∼pi [r(a1, . . . , aN )] ≤ 
We define a similar metric to NashCov for the empirical distance to a coarse-correlated equilibrium
(CCE) [82], given its relationship to no-regret learning algorithms. Note, importantly, when talking
about the multiplayer (n > 2) variants, pit−i is always the average joint policy over all of player i’s
opponents, rather than the player-wise marginal average policies composed into a joint policy (these
correspond to the same notion of average policy for the special case of n = 2, but not generally).
Definition 1 (CCEDist). For an n-player normal form game with players i ∈ N = {1 · · ·n}, utility
function u, joint action set A = A1 × · · · × An, let ai→∗ be the joint action where player i replaces
their action with a∗i ; given a correlation device (distribution over joint actions) µ,
CCEDIST(µ) =
∑
i∈N
max(0, max
a∗i∈Ai
Ea∼µ[ui(ai→∗, a−i)− ui(a)]).
A.2 A Generalization of Best Response Policy Iteration
Algorithm 3 presents the general family of response-style algorithms that we consider (covering our
approaches in Section 3.2).
Algorithm 3 A Generalization of BRPI
Require: arbitrary initial policy pi0, total steps T
for time step t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T} do
for player i ∈ {1, · · · , n} do
(response, values)← COMPUTERESPONSE(i, pit−1−i )
piti ← UPDATEPOLICY(i, response, values)
return piT
Several algorithms fit into this general framework. For example, the simplest is tabular iterated
best response (IBR), where the UPDATEPOLICY simply overwrites the policy with a best response
policy. Classical fictitious play (FP) is obtained when COMPUTERESPONSE returns a best response
and UPDATEPOLICY updates the policy to be the average of all best responses seen up to time t.
Stochastic fictitious play (SFP) [36] is obtained when the best response policy is defined as a softmax
over action values rather than the argmax, i.e. returning a policy
piti(a) = SOFTMAXλ(u
t
i)(a) =
exp(λuti(a))∑
a exp(λu
t
i(a))
,
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where uti is a vector of expected utility for each action. Exploitability Descent [76] defines UP-
DATEPOLICY based on gradient descent. We describe several versions of the algorithm used in
Diplomacy below. A spectrum of game-theoretic algorithms is described in [69].
We run several experiments on different game instances. The number of actions and size of each is
listed in Table 2.
n c f Number of actions per player (|Ai|) Size of matrix / tensor (= |Ai|n)
2 10 3 66 4356
2 30 3 496 246016
2 15 4 816 665856
2 10 5 1001 1002001
2 10 6 3003 9018009
3 10 3 66 287496
4 8 3 45 4100625
5 6 3 28 17210368
Table 2: Blotto Game Sizes
A.3 Warm-up: Fictitious Play versus Iterated Best Response (IBR)
We first analyze convergence properties of various forms of BRPI, highlighting the difference between
IBR and FP approaches.
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Figure 4: Convergence of Fictitious Play versus Iterated Best Response variants in (a) Blotto(2, 10,
3), and (b) Blotto(3, 10, 3).
Figure 4(a) shows the convergence rates to approximate Nash equilibria of fictitious play and iterated
best response in Blotto(2, 10, 3). We observe that that FP is reducing NashConv over time while
IBR is not. In fact, IBR remains fully exploitable on every iteration. It may be cycling around new
best responses, but every best response is individually fully exploitable: for every action [x, y, z]
there exists a response of the form [x+ 1, y+ 1, z − 2] which beats it, so playing deterministically in
Blotto is always exploitable, which demonstrates the importance of using a stochastic policy. The
convergence graphs for FP and IBR look similar with n = 3 players (Figure 4(b), despite both being
known to not converge generally, see [54] for a counter-example).
One problem with IBR in this case is that it places its entire weight on the newest best response. FP
mitigates this effectively by averaging, i.e. only moving toward this policy with a step size of αt ≈ 1t .
One question, then, is whether having a stochastic operator could improve IBR’s convergence rate.
We see that indeed MaxEnt IBR– which returns a mixed best response choosing uniformly over all the
tied best response actions– does find policies that are not fully-exploitable; however, the NashConv is
still non-convergent and not decreasing over time.
Finally, we consider the convergence of Stochastic FP, which seems to reduce NashConv over time as
well; however, the choice of the temperature λ has a strong effect on the convergence curve, improving
with high λ (moving closer to a true best response). The plateaus occur due to the fact that the
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introduction of the softmax induces convergence towards Quantal Response Equilibria (QRE) [78, 47]
rather than Nash equilibria and can be interpreted as entropy-regularizing the reward [88]. Further,
unlike FP, SFP is Hannan-consistent [38] and can be interpreted as a probabilistic best response
operator. This supports the claim that “stochastic rules perform better than deterministic ones” [37].
We elaborate on these points in Appendix H.
A.4 Fictitious Play using Sampled Best Response
In this subsection, we refer to FP+SBR(B,C) as the instance of algorithm 3 that averages the policies
like fictitious play but uses a Sampled Best Response operator as described in Algorithm 1, using B
base profiles and C candidates, where the base profile sampling policy is simply pit and the candidate
sampling policy is uniform over all actions.
A.4.1 Trade-offs and Scaling
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Figure 5: Convergence of Fictitious Play versus FP+SBR(10,50) by elapsed time in 2-player Blotto
with increasing action space sizes where (a) > (b) > (c) > (d).
Figure 5 shows several convergence graphs of different 2-player Blotto games with increasing action
sizes using elapsed time as the x-axis. The first observation is that, in all cases, FP+SBR computes
a policy in a matter of milliseconds, thousands of times earlier than FP’s first point. Secondly, it
appears that as the action space the game grows, the point by which SBR achieves a specific value and
when FP achieves the same value gets further apart: that is, SBR is getting a result with some quality
sooner than FP. For example, in Blotto(2, 10, 6), SBR can achieve the an approximation accuracy in 1
second which takes FP over three hours to achieve. To quantify the trade-offs, we compute a factor of
elapsed time to reach the value by FP divided by elapsed time taken to reach NashConv ≈ 0.2 by
FP+SBR(10,50). These values are 1203, 1421, 2400, and 2834 for the four games by increasing size.
This trade-off is only true up to some threshold accuracy; the benefit of approximation from sampling
from SBR leads to plateaus long-term and is eventually surpassed by FP. However, for large enough
games even a single full iteration of FP is not feasible.
The trade-offs are similar in (n > 2)-player games. Figure 6 shows three games of increasing size
with reduced action sizes to ensure the game was not too large so joint policies could still fit into
memory. There is a similar trade-off in the case of 3-player, where it is clear that FP catches up. In
Blotto(4,8,3), even > 25000 seconds was not enough for the convergence of FP to catch-up, and
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Figure 6: Convergence of Fictitious Play versus FP+SBR(10,25) by elapsed time in (a) Blotto(3, 10,
3) (b) Blotto(4, 6, 3), and (c) Blotto(5, 6, 3).
took > 10000 seconds for Blotto(5,6,3). In each case, FP+SBR took at most 1 second to reach the
CCEDist value at the catch-up point.
A.4.2 Effects of choices of B and C
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Figure 7: Convergence rates of FP+SBR(B,C) for various settings of B and C. The first row uses
the game of Blotto(3, 10, 3), second row Blotto(4, 8, 3), and third row Blotto(5, 6, 3). The columns
represent B = 4, B = 32, and B = 64, respectively from left to right.
Figure 7 shows the effect of varying B and C in FP+SBR(B,C). Low values of B clearly lead to
early plateaus further from equilibrium (graphs for B < 4 look similar). At low number of base
profiles, it seems that there is a region of low number of candidate samples (2-4) that works best
for which plateau is reached, presumably because the estimated maximum over a crude estimate of
the expected value has smaller error. As B increases, the distance to equilibria becomes noticeably
smaller and sampling more candidates works significantly better than at low B.
In the two largest games, FP+SBR(64, 64) was able to reach a CCEDist ≤ 0.3 while fictitious play
was still more than three times further from equilibrium after six hours of running time.
A.5 BRPI Convergence and Approximation Quality
FP+SBR is an idealized version of the algorithm that explicit performs policy averaging identical to
the outer loop of fictitious play: only the best response step is replaced by a stochastic operator.
20
We now analyze an algorithm that is closer to emulating BRPI as described in the main paper. Due to
stochasticity the policy, the policy trained by BRPI at iteration t for player i can be described as the
empirical (joint) distribution:
pit =
1
N
N∑
n=1
1(a), where a ∼ SBR(pitb, pitc, B,C),
where 1(a) is the deterministic joint policy that chooses joint action a with probability 1, SBR is the
stochastic argmax operator defined in Algorithm 1, and {pitb, pitc} are the base profile and candidate
sampling policies which are generally functions of (pi0, pit, · · · , pit−1).
The average of the operator over N samples models the best possible fit to dataset of N samples
A.5.1 Effects of choices of B and C
To start, in order to compare to the idealized form, we show similar graphs using settings which most
closely match FP+SBR: pitb uniformly t ∼ UNIF({0, · · · , t− 1} and then samples a base profile from
pit, and pic samples from the initial policy where all players play each action uniformly at random.
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Figure 8: Convergence rates of BRPI(pib, pic, B,C) for various settings of B and C using a uniform
iteration for pib and uniform random action for pic, and N = 1000. The first row uses the game of
Blotto(3, 10, 3), second row Blotto(4, 8, 3), and third row Blotto(5, 6, 3). The columns represent
B = 1, B = 4, and B = 64, respectively from left to right.
Figure 8 show effects of varying B and C over the games. Note that convergence to the plateau is
much faster than FP+SBR, presumably because of the N samples per iteration rather than folding
one sample into the average. Like with FP+SBR, the value of B has a strong effect on the plateau
that is reached, and this value is separated by the choice of C. Unlike FP+SBR the value of C has a
different effect: higher C is generally better at lower values of B. This could be due to the fact that,
in BRPI, the only way the algorithm can represent a stochastic policy is via the N samples, whereas
FP+SBR computes the average policy exactly; the error in the max over a crude expectation may be
less critical than having a granularity of a fixed limit of N samples.
This is an encouraging result as it shows that a mixed policy can be trained through multiple samples
from a stochastic best response operator on each iteration, rather than computing the average policy
explicity. However, this comes at the extra cost of remembering all the past policies; in large games,
this can be done by saving checkpoints of the network periodically and querying them as necessary.
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A.5.2 Varying the Candidate Sampling Policy
Most of the runs look similar to the previous subsection (convergence plateau is mostly reached
within 60 – 100 seconds), so to demonstrate the effect of the various candidate sampling policies, we
instead show the CCEDist reached after running for a long time (> 50000 seconds). This roughly
captures the asymptotic value of each method, rather than its convergence rate.
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Figure 9: Long-term CCEDist reached by BRPI(2, 16) with pib choosing a uniform past policy in
Blotto(3, 10, 3) (left), Blotto(4, 8, 3) (middle), and Blotto(5, 6, 3) (right).
Figure 9 shows the long-term CCEDist reached by BRPI at B = 2 and C = 16 for various choices
of the candidate sampling schemes. There is a clearly best choice of using uniformly sampled past
policy to choose candidates followed by the mixtures: initial + uniform, and initial + latest.
A.5.3 Iterated Sampled Best Response
We now consider the case where the base sampling policy is the last policy: pitb = pi
t−1. Figure 10
shows the long-term CCEDist reached by BRPI at B = 2 and C = 16 for various choices of the
candidate sampling schemes.
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Figure 10: Long-term CCEDist reached by BRPI(2, 16) with with pitb = pi
t−1 in Blotto(3, 10, 3)
(left), Blotto(4, 8, 3) (middle), and Blotto(5, 6, 3) (right).
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In this case, there is no clear winner in all cases, but initial + latest seems to be a safe choice among
these five sampling schemes. Despite the plateau values being generally higher than pib sampling
from a uniform past policy across the candidate sampling schemes (note the y-axis scale differs
between the two plots), the values under the initial + latest sampling policy are matched in two of the
three games.
Though using the last policy for pib yields generally higher final plateaus in CCEDist, the fact that
these are comparable to those achieved by FP+SBR stands in stark contrast to when we use an exact
best response operator in A.3; in that case, Iterated Best Response makes no progress. This shows that
using a Sampled Best Response in the place of an exact one can dramatically improve the behaviour
of Iterated Best Response.
B Additional Results
B.1 Behavioural analysis
We present some descriptive statistics of the behaviour exhibited by the different networks in self-
play games, and by human players in the datasets. We examine the move-phase actions of agents,
investigating the tendency of agents to support another power’s unit to move or hold, which we
refer to as “cross power support”. We also examine the success rates, which are defined by whether
the other power made a corresponding move for that unit (respectively, either the target move or
a non-moving order). Figure 11a compares the proportion of actions that are cross power support
across different agents, and their success (for both holding and moving). The results indicate the
BRPI agents have a substantially reduced rate of cross power hold support, and the BRPI agents have
a substantially increased rate of cross-power move support. The A2C agent attempts both types of
support less often but succeeds a higher proportion of the time.
This analysis is related but different to the cross-support analysis in [86], which considers cross-
power supports as a proportion of supports, and rather than looking at “success” as we’ve defined
it for support orders, they measure “effectiveness”, defined in terms of whether the support made a
difference for the success of the move order or defence being supported.
We also examine the propensity of agents to intrude on other agents, defined as one of the following:
• a move order (including via convoy) into a territory on which another agent has a unit
• a move order (including via convoy) into a supply center owned by another agent (or
remaining/holding in another agent’s supply center during fall turns)
• successfully supporting/convoying a move falling in the categories above
We define two powers to be at conflict in a moves phase∗∗ if either one intrudes upon the other, and
to be distant if neither one has the option of doing that. Then we define the peace proportion of a
network to be the proportion, among instances in which powers are non-distant, that they’re not at
conflict; and the peace correlation to be the correlation, among those same instances, between conflict
in the current moves phase and conflict in the next moves phase. In Figure 11b we compare these
statistics across our different networks. These results indicate that BRPI reduces the peace proportion
while maintaining the peace correlation, while A2C brings down both the peace proportion and the
peace correlation significantly.
We used sampling temperature 0.1 for these agents, and considered only the first 10 years of each
game in order to make the comparisons more like-for-like, particularly to human games. We used
1000 self-play games for each network; results for IBR, FPPI-1, and FPPI-2 were combined from
results for the final networks from 5 training runs. In addition we included the evaluation sets from
both our press and no-press datasets, excluding games that end within 5 years and games where no
player achieved 7 supply centers.
B.2 Exploitability
In this section we give more details on our experiments on the exploitability of our networks. We use
for two different exploiters for each agent we exploit, both of which are based on the Sampled Best
∗∗We exclude other phases from this analysis.
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(a) Comparison of the cross-power support behaviours of different networks.
(b) Comparison of peace correlations between dif-
ferent networks.
Figure 11: Descriptive behavioural statistics of the different networks, as well as human play in the
datasets.
Response operator, using a small number of samples from the policy as the base profiles to respond
to.
Firstly, we use a few shot exploiter. Apart from using base profiles from the policy being exploited,
but otherwise is independent from it – the value function for SBR is taken from an independent
BRPI run (the same for all networks exploited), and the candidates from the human imitation policy;
SBR(pic = piSL, pib = pi, v = V RL). This has the advantage of being the most comparable between
different policies; the exploits found are not influenced by the strength of the network’s value function,
or by the candidates they provide to SBR. This measure should still be used with care; it is possible
for an agent to achieve low few-shot exploitability without being strong at the game, for example by
all agents playing pre-specified moves, and uniting to defeat any deviator.
The other exploiter shown is the best found for each policy. For policies from the end of BRPI
training, this is SBR(pic = piSL + pi, pib = pi, v = V pi), which uses a mixture of candidates from
the exploitee and supervised learning, and the exploitee’s value function. For piSL, we instead use
SBR(pic = piSL + piRL, pib = pi, v = V RL), where piRL and v = V RL are from a BRPI run. This
is because the value function learned from human data is not correct for piSL, and leadds to weak
exploits.
Figure 12 shows the winrates achieved by each of these exploiters playing with 6 copies of a network,
for our supervised learning agent and the final agent from one run of each BRPI setting. All these
networks are least exploitable at t = 0.5; this appears to balance the better strategies typically seen at
lower temperatures with the mixing needed to be relatively unexploitable. In the few-shot regime,
IBR and FPPI-2 produce agents which are less exploitable than the supervised learning agent; for the
best exploiters found, the picture is less clear. This may be because we do not have as good a value
function for games with piSL as we do for the other policies.
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Figure 12: Exploiter winrates of imitation and final BRPI networks. Left column shows the exploits
achieved by few shot exploiters, right column the best exploiters found.
Tables 3 and 4 shows lower bounds on the exploitability of the final training targets from the three
RL runs, again with few-shot and best exploiters. This gives a lower bound for exploitability which
is less than for the networks these targets are improving on. This is particularly interesting for the
training target for IBR – which consists of a single iteration of Sampled Best Response. This is in
contrast with what we would see with an exact best response, which would be a highly exploitable
deterministic policy.
All the exploiting agents here use 64 candidates for SBR at each temperature in (0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 1.0).
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1 profile 2 profiles 4 profiles
IBR 0.008± 0.009 0.063± 0.011 0.129± 0.012
FPPI-1 0.107± 0.013 0.189± 0.015 0.262± 0.016
FPPI-2 0.021± 0.011 0.066± 0.012 0.140± 0.014
Target(IBR) −0.027± 0.008 0.002± 0.009 0.063± 0.012
Target(FPPI-1) −0.012± 0.015 0.066± 0.019 0.156± 0.024
Target(FPPI-2) −0.032± 0.014 0.024± 0.018 0.127± 0.024
Table 3: Few-shot exploitability of final networks training targets with different numbers of base
profiles. Networks are shown at the temperature with the highest lower bound on exploitability.
1 profile 2 profiles 4 profiles
IBR 0.160± 0.019 0.251± 0.022 0.341± 0.022
FPPI-1 0.177± 0.021 0.319± 0.023 0.364± 0.023
FPPI-2 0.223± 0.020 0.338± 0.021 0.411± 0.023
Target(IBR) 0.049± 0.011 0.109± 0.013 0.187± 0.015
Target(FPPI-1) 0.149± 0.019 0.257± 0.022 0.373± 0.024
Target(FPPI-2) 0.051± 0.016 0.157± 0.019 0.271± 0.022
Table 4: Best lower bound on exploitability of final networks and training targets with different
numbers of base profiles. Networks are shown at the temperature with the highest lower bound on
exploitability.
B.3 Head to head comparisons
Here, we add to Table 1 additional comparisons where we run a test-time improvement step on our
initial and final networks. These steps use a more expensive version of SBR than we use in training;
we sample 64 candidates from the network at each of four temperatures (0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 1.0), and also
sample the base profiles at temperature 0.1. We only compare these training targets to the networks
and training targets for other runs – comparing a training target to the network from the same run
would be similar to the exploits trained in Appendix B.2.
For the final networks, these improvement steps perform well against the final networks (from their
own algorithm and other algorithms). For the initial network, the resulting policy loses to all agents
except the imitation network it is improving on; we hypothesise that this is a result of the value
function, which is trained on the human dataset and so may be inaccurate for network games.
We also add the agent produced by our implementation of A2C, as described in E.
SL
[86]
A2C
[86]
SL
(ours)
A2C
(ours)
FPPI-1
net
IBR
net
FPPI-2
net
SBR-
SL
SBR-
IBR
SBR-
FPPI-2
SL [86] 14.2% 8.3% 16.3% 7.7% 2.3% 1.8% 0.8% 38.6% 2.1% 2.3%
A2C [86] 15.1% 14.2% 15.3% 17.0% 2.3% 1.7% 0.9% 54.9% 2.3% 2.4%
SL (ours) 12.6% 7.7% 14.1% 10.6% 3.0% 1.9% 1.1% 28.1% 1.6% 1.4%
A2C 14.1% 3.5% 18.7% 14.1% 2.8% 2.3% 1.2% 36.6% 2.2% 1.7%
FPPI-1 net 26.4% 28.0% 25.9% 30.9% 14.4% 7.4% 4.5% 67.0% 4.4% 3.0%
IBR net 20.7% 30.5% 25.8% 29.4% 20.3% 12.9% 10.9% 70.2% 5.5% 8.0%
FPPI-2 net 19.4% 32.5% 20.8% 32.1% 22.4% 13.8% 12.7% 73.6% 6.6% 8.1%
SBR-SL 12.5% 1.8% 15.8% 9.2% 0.9% 0.5% 0.1% 14.1% 0.2% 0.2%
SBR-IBR 24.5% 23.3% 28.4% 30.3% 37.7% 37.8% 31.4% 57.7% 14.4% 16.0%
SBR-FP-2 20.0% 23.1% 32.2% 29.0% 44.3% 28.2% 35.0% 62.2% 14.9% 14.9%
Table 5: Matches between different algorithms. Winrates for 1 row player vs 6 column players
In Table 6, we give comparisons for the final networks of agents trained using the design space of
BRPI specified in 3.2. The notation for candidate policies and base profiles is pi0 for the imitation
network we start training from, pit−1 is the policy from the previous iteration, and µt−1 is the average
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of the policies from previous iterations. Vt−1 is the value function from the previous iteration, and
V µt−1 is the average value function from the previous iterations. When µt−1 and V
µ
t−1 are used, the
sampling is coupled; the value function is from the same network used for the candidates and/or base
profiles.
The fourth column of Table 6 records which kind of BRPI method each is. Methods that use the latest
policy only for base profiles are IBR methods, uniformly sampled base profiles are FP methods. FP
methods that use the latest networks for the value function or for candidate sampling do not recreate
the historical best responses, so are FPPI-2 methods. The remaining methods are FPPI-1 methods.
The asterisks mark the examples of IBR, FPPI-1 and FPPI-2 selected for deeper analysis in section 5;
these were chosen based on results of experiments during development that indicated that including
candidates from the imitation policy was helpful. In particular, they were not selected based on the
outcome of the training runs presented in this work.
We find that against the population of final networks from all BRPI runs (1 vs 6 BRPI), IBR and
FPPI-2 do better than FPPI-1. For candidate selection, using candidates from the latest and initial
networks performs best. For beating the DipNet baseline, we find that using candidates from the
imitation policy improves performance substantially. This may be because our policies are regularised
towards the style of play of these agents, and so remain more able to play in populations consisting of
these agents.
pic pib V BRPI
type
1 vs
6 BRPI
1 BRPI
vs 6
1 vs
6 DipNet
1 DipNet
vs 6
pi0 pit−1 Vt−1 IBR 9.6% 16.1% 24.7% 4.0%
pi0 µt−1 Vt−1 FPPI-2 9.8% 17.7% 24.4% 3.7%
pi0 µt−1 V
µ
t−1 FPPI-1 8.5% 17.1% 27.3% 3.3%
µt−1 pit−1 Vt−1 IBR 15.4% 10.9% 25.9% 1.3%
µt−1 µt−1 Vt−1 FPPI-2 14.0% 12.6% 22.3% 1.7%
µt−1 µt−1 V
µ
t−1 FPPI-1 9.3% 15.6% 24.4% 2.3%
µt−1 + pi0 pit−1 Vt−1 IBR 14.3% 12.8% 25.5% 2.0%
µt−1 + pi0 µt−1 Vt−1 FPPI-2 13.8% 12.6% 26.1% 1.7%
µt−1 + pi0 µt−1 V
µ
t−1 FPPI-1* 9.3% 17.2% 26.4% 2.3%
pit−1 pit−1 Vt−1 IBR 16.0% 7.5% 14.3% 0.5%
pit−1 µt−1 Vt−1 FPPI-2 17.4% 6.9% 13.2% 0.7%
pit−1 µt−1 V
µ
t−1 FPPI-2 9.7% 15.5% 13.6% 3.5%
pit−1 + pi0 pit−1 Vt−1 IBR* 16.4% 9.8% 20.7% 1.8%
pit−1 + pi0 µt−1 Vt−1 FPPI-2* 17.6% 8.2% 19.4% 0.8%
pit−1 + pi0 µt−1 V
µ
t−1 FPPI-2 12.5% 13.2% 23.9% 1.8%
pi0 mean mean - 9.3% 17.0% 25.5% 3.7%
µt−1 mean mean - 12.9% 13.0% 24.2% 1.8%
µt−1 + pi0 mean mean - 12.5% 14.2% 26.0% 2.0%
pit−1 mean mean - 14.4% 10.0% 13.7% 1.6%
pit−1 + pi0 mean mean - 15.5% 10.4% 21.4% 1.5%
mean pit−1 Vt−1 - 14.3% 11.4% 22.2% 1.9%
mean µt−1 V
µ
t−1 - 9.9% 15.7% 23.1% 2.6%
mean µt−1 Vt−1 - 14.5% 11.6% 21.1% 1.7%
Table 6: Performance of different BRPI variants against BRPI and DipNet agents. The scores are all
for the 1 agent. All results are accurate to 0.5% within a confidence interval of 95%
C Imitation Learning and Neural Network Architecture
We fully describe the architecture of the neural network we use for approximating policy and value
functions, including hyperparameter settings. The architecture is illustrated in Figure 13.
Our network outputs policy logits for each unit on the board controlled by the current player p, as
well as a value estimate for p. It takes as inputs:
27
Figure 13: The neural network architecture for producing actions.
• xb, a representation of the current state of the board, encoded with the same 35 board
features per area †† used in DipNet
• xm, the state of the board during the last moves phase, encoded the same way
• xo, the orders issued since that phase
• s, the current Season
• p, the current power
• xd, the current build numbers (i.e. the difference between the number of supply centres and
units for each power)
Similar to DipNet, we first produce a representation of previous gameplay. This incorporates learned
embeddings eo(xo), es(s), and ep(p) applied to the recent orders, the season, and the power. The
recent orders embeddings are summed in each area, producing e˜o(xo). We begin by concatenating
xm and e˜o(xo) to produce x˜m. Then, we concatenate xd and es(s) to each of xb and x˜m to produce
x¯b = [xb, xd, es(s)] and x¯m = [xm, eo(xo), xd, es(s)]. (DipNet uses hardcoded “alliance features”
in place of x˜m, and leaves out xd.)
Next, we process each of x¯b and x¯m with identical, but independent stacks of 12 Graph Neural
Networks (GNNs) [12] linked (apart from the first layer) by residual connections. In particular, each
residual GNN computes x¯`+1 = x¯`+ ReLU(BatchNorm([ˆ¯x`, A · ˆ¯x`])), where ˆ¯x`n,j =
∑
i x¯
`
n,iw
`
n,i,j ,
with ` indexing layers in the stack, n the areas, A the normalized adjacency matrix of the Diplomacy
board, and x¯ being a stand-in for either x¯b or x¯m. After concatenating ep(p) to the resulting
embeddings, we use 3 additional GNN layers with residual connections to construct xs,pb and x
s,p
m ,
which we concatenate to form our final state encoding xs,p = [xs,pb , x
s,p
m ]. Note that, although DipNet
describes their encoders as Graph Convolutional Networks, their GNNs are not convolutional over
nodes, and weights are not tied between GNNs – this produced better results, and we followed suit.
The value outputs are computed from the state encodings xs,p by averaging them across p and s, and
then applying a ReLU MLP with a single hidden layer to get value logits.
Like DipNet, we construct order lists from our state encoding xs,p considering one by one the
provinces n(1), . . . , n(k) requiring an order from p according to a fixed order. Unlike DipNet,
we use a Relational Order Decoder (ROD). Our ROD module is a stack of 4 GNNs with residual
connections that, when considering the k-th province, takes as input the concatenation of xs,pn(k)
††An area is any location that can contain a unit. This is the 75 provinces (e.g. Portugal, Spain), plus the 6
coastal areas of the three bicoastal provinces (e.g. Spain (south coast), Spain (north coast)).
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and zn(1),...,n(k−1). Precisely, x
s,p
n(k) is a masked version of x
s,p where all province representations
except n(k) are zeroed out, and zn(1),...,n(k−1) contains embeddings of the orders already on the list
scattered to the slots corresponding to the provinces they referred to: n(1), . . . , n(k − 1). The output
of the ROD corresponding to province n(k) is then mapped to action logits through a linear layer
with no bias w. Similarly to DipNet, after sampling, the row of w corresponding to the order selected
is used to fill in the n(k)-th row of zn(1),...,n(k−1),n(k).
Table 7 compares the imitation accuracy and winrates improvements when switching from the DipNet
neural architecture to the one we use (indicating a slight improvement in performance). For our
RL experiments we chose the architecture with the highest imitation accuracy despite its decline in
winrates; this is because the RL improvement loop relies on imitation, so imitation performance is
the chief desideratum.
Furthermore, the winrates are affected by a confounding factor that we uncovered while inspecting
the imperfect winrate of the final imitation network against a random policy. What we found was that
in games where the network didn’t beat the random policy, the network was playing many consecutive
all-holds turns, and hitting a 50-year game length limit in our environment. This reflects the dataset:
human players sometimes abandon their games, which shows up as playing all-holds turns for the
rest of the game. We hypothesize that the encoder that observes the preceding moves-phase board,
and especially the actions since then, is better able to represent and reproduce this behaviour. This is
to its detriment when playing games, but is easily addressed by the improvement operator.
Imitation accuracy (%) Winrates (%)
Teacher forcing Whole-turn vs Random vs DipNet SL
Architecture Press No-press Press No-press 1v6 6v1 1v6 6v1
DipNet replication 56.35 58.03 25.67 26.86 100 16.67 15.99 14.42
+Encoder changes 59.08 60.32 30.79 30.28 100 16.66 16.75 14.51
+Relational decoder 60.08 61.97 30.26 30.73 100 16.67 17.71 14.33
−Alliance features 60.68 62.46 30.96 31.36 99.16 16.66 13.30 14.25
Table 7: Imitation learning improvements resulting from our changes to DipNet [86].
C.1 Hyperparameters
For the inputs, we use embedding sizes 10, 16, and 16 for the recent orders xo, the power p, and the
season s, in addition to the same 35 board features per area used in DipNet. The value decoder has a
single hidden layer of size 256. The relational order decoder uses an embedding of size 256 for each
possible action.
The imitation networks were trained on a P100 GPU, using an Adam optimizer with learning rate
0.003 and batch size 256, on a 50-50 mixture of the No-Press and Press datasets used for DipNet. The
datasets were shuffled once on-disk, and were sampled during training via a buffer of 104 timesteps
into which whole games were loaded. During training we filtered out powers that don’t end with at
least 7 SCs as policy targets, and filtered out games where no power attains 7 SCs as value targets.
2000 randomly selected games from each dataset were held out as a validation set.
Power and season embeddings were initialized with random uniform entries in [−1, 1]. Previous-order
embeddings were initialized with random standard normal entries. The decoder’s action embeddings
were initialized with truncated normal entries with mean 0 and standard deviation 1/
√
18584 (18584
is the number of possible actions). The GNN weights were initialized with truncated normal entries
with mean 0 and standard deviation 2/
√
(input width) · (number of areas). The value network was
initialized with truncated standard normal entries with mean 0 and standard deviation 1/
√
input width
for both its hidden layer and its output layer.
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C.2 Data cleaning
We use the dataset introduced in [86] for our pre-training on human imitation data. Before doing so,
we run the following processing steps, to deal with the fact that the data is from a variety of sources
and contains some errors:
• We exclude any games labelled in the dataset as being on non-standard maps, with fewer
than the full 7 players, or with non-standard rules.
• We attempt to apply all actions in the game to our environment. If we do so successfully, we
include the game in the dataset. We use observations generated by our environment, not the
observations from the dataset, because some of the dataset’s observations were inconsistent
with the recorded actions.
• As final rewards for training our value function, we take the reward from the dataset. For
drawn games, we award 1/n to each of the n surviving players.
• We deal with the following variations in the rules (because not every game was played under
the same ruleset):
– Some data sources apparently played forced moves automatically. So if there is only
one legal move, and no move for the turn in the dataset, we play the legal move.
– Some variants infer whether a move is a convoy or land movement from the other
orders of the turn, rather than making this explicit. To parse these correctly, we retry
failed games, changing move orders to convoys if the country ordering the move also
ordered a fleet to perform a convoy of the same route. For example, if the orders are A
BEL - HOL, F HOL - BEL and F NTH C BEL - HOL, we update the first order to be
A BEL - HOL (via convoy). If this rewritten game can be parsed correctly, we use this
for our imitation data.
• Any game which can not be parsed with these attempted corrections is excluded from the
dataset. One large class of games that cannot be parsed is those played under a ruleset where
the coast of supports matters – that is, a move to Spain (sc) can fail because a support is
ordered to Spain (nc) instead. Other than these, the errors were varied; the first 20 games
manually checked appear to have units ending up in places which are inconsistent with their
orders, or similar errors. It is possible that these involved manual changes to the game state
external to the adjudicator, or were run with adjudicators which either had bugs or used
non-standard rulesets.
This process resulted in number of exclusions and final data-sets sizes reported in Tab. 8.
Training set Validation set
Press No-press Press No-press
Available games 104456 31279 2000 2000
Excluded: non-standard map 833 10659 17 705
Excluded: non-standard rules 863 1 19 0
Excluded: min SCs not met 2954 517 48 31
Excluded: unable to parse 3554 79 78 4
Included 96252 20023 1838 1260
Table 8: Number of games available, included and excluded in our data-sets.
Diplomacy has been published with multiple rulebooks, which slightly differ in some ways. Some
rulebooks do not completely specify the rules, or introduce paradoxes. The Diplomacy Adjudicator
Test Cases describe a variety of rulesets, interpretations and paradox resolution methods [65]. We
make the same interpretations as the webDiplomacy website [67]. Our adjudicator uses Kruijswijk’s
algorithm [66].
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D BRPI settings
For all the reinforcement learning runs reported, we use the settings as in section C.1 for the learning
settings, with the exception of the learning rate for Adam, which is 10−4. We update the policy
iteration target by adding a new checkpoint every 7.5 million steps of experience. We use an
experience replay buffer of size 50000; to save on the amount of experience needed, each datapoint is
sampled 4 times before it is evicted from the buffer.
For sampled best response, we use 2 base profiles. We sample 16 candidate moves for each player; in
the case where we use two sources of candidate (such as piSL and latest checkpoint), we sample 8
from each. The base profiles are the same for each of the 7 powers, and if the policy being responded
to is the same as a policy producing candidates, we reuse the base profiles as candidate moves.
We force draws in our games after random lengths of time. The minimum game length is 2 years;
after that we force draws each year with probability 0.05. Since our agents do not know how to
agree draws when the game is stalemated, this gives the game length a human-like distribution and
incentivises agents to survive even when they are unlikely to win. When games are drawn in this way,
we award final rewards dependent on supply centres, giving each power a reward of the proportion of
all controlled SCs which they control at the end of the game. Otherwise, no rewards are given except
for a reward of 1 for winning.
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Figure 14: Winrate of 1 A2C v. 6 Imitation Learning (SL). Shaded areas are error-bars over 7000
games, uniformly distributed over the power controlled by A2C. The step counter on the horizontal
axis shows the number of state, action, rewards triplets used by the central learner. Note that this is
different than other RL plots in the text, where policy iteration loops are shown.
In this section we describe our implementation of the batched advantage actor-critic (A2C) with
V-Trace off policy correction algorithm we used as our policy gradient baseline [29], and very briefly
comment on its performance. As in our BRPI experiment, we let Reinforcement Learning training
start from our Imitation Learning baseline. We use the same network architecture as for BRPI.
Our implementation of A2C uses a standard actor-learner architecture where actors periodically
receive network parameters from a central learner, and produce experience using self-play. The single
central learner, in turn, retrieves the experience generated by our actors, and updates its policy and
value network parameters using batched A2C with importance weighting.
Two points to note in our implementation:
1. Diplomacy’s action space is complex: our network outputs an order for each of the provinces
controlled by player p at each turn. Orders for each province are computed one by one,
and our ROD module ensures inter-province consistency. We therefore expand the off
policy correction coefficients for acting policy µ and target policy pi as follows: ρ =
pi(at|st)
µ(at|st) =
ppi(at1 |st)ppi(at2 |at1 ,st)...ppi(atk |at1 ,...,atk−1 ,st)
pµ(at1 |st)pµ(at2 |at1 ,st)...pµ(atk |at1 ,...,atk−1 ,st)
, where ppi(atl |at1 , . . . , atl−1) is
the probability of selecting order atl for unit l, given the state of the board at time t, st, and
all orders for previous units at1 , . . . , atl−1 , under policy pi.
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2. We do not train the value target using TD. Instead, just as in the imitation step of BRPI
algorithms, we augment trajectories with returns and use supervised learning directly on
this target.
3. As in D, we force draws after random lengths of time, and otherwise only have rewards
when games are won. This differs to the A2C agent trained in [86], where a dense reward
was given for capturing supply centres.
Fig. 14 shows A2C’s performance in 1v6 tournaments against the Imitation Learning starting point
(SL). We observe that A2C’s win-rate in this setting steadily increases for about 3M steps, and then
gradually declines. In comparisons to other algorithms, we report the performance of the A2C agent
with the best win-rate against its Imitation Learning starting point.
F Calculation of Confidence Intervals
The confidence intervals in figure 2 are for the mean scores of 5 different experiments. The confidence
interval is for the variation in the means across the random seeds. This is calculated based on a
normal distribution assumption with unknown variance (i.e. using a t-distribution with 4 degrees of
freedom) [64].
The confidence intervals quoted for 1v6 winrate tables are the measurement confidence interval, they
only reflect randomness in the outcomes of games between our actual agents, and do not represent
differences due to randomness during training the agents. To calculate the confidence interval, we first
calculate the confidence interval for the winrate for each combination of singleton agent, 6-country
agent, and country the singleton agent plays as. For this confidence interval, we use the Wilson
confidence interval (with continuity correction) [121]. We then combine the confidence intervals
using the first method from Waller et al. [119]. Unlike using a single Wilson confidence interval on
all data, this corrects for any imbalance in the distribution over agents or countries played in the data
generated, for example due to timeouts or machine failures during evaluation.
G Gradient Descent for Finding an -Nash Equilibrium in the Meta-Game
Given our definition for an -Nash, we measure distance from a Nash equilibrium with Lexp(x) =∑
i Lexpi(x), known as exploitability or Nash-conv, and attempt to compute an approximate Nash
equilibrium via gradient descent. By redefining ri ← ri + τentropy(xi), we approach a Quantal
Response Equilibrium [78] (QRE) instead; QRE models players with bounded rationality (τ ∈ [0,∞)
recovers rational (Nash) and non-rational at its extremes). Further, QRE can be viewed as a method
that performs entropy-regularizing of the reward, which helps convergence in various settings [88].
For further discussion of QRE and its relation to convergence of FP methods, see Appendix H.
Computing a Nash equilibrium is PPAD-complete in general [85], however, computing the relaxed
solution of an -Nash equilibrium proved to be tractable in this setting when the number of strategies
is sufficiently small.
Note that a gradient descent method over Lexp(x) is similar to, but not the same as Exploitability
Descent [76]. Whereas exploitability descent defines a per-player exploitability, and each player
independently descends their own exploitability, this algorithm performs gradient descent on the
exploitability of the strategy profile (Lexp(x) above), across all agents.
H Theoretical Properties of Fictitious Play
Appendix A discusses the relation between the FP variants of BRPI described in Section 3.2 and
Stochastic Fictitious Play [36] (SFP). We now investigate the convergence properties of SFP, extending
analysis done for two-player games to many-player games (3 or more players). Our key theoretical
result is that SFP converges to an -coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) in such settings. We make
use of the same notation introduced in Appendix A.1.
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We first introduce some notation we use. A Quantal best response equilibrium with parameter λ is a
situation where a policy pi is such that:
∀i, pii(ai) = exp
( ri
pi−i (ai)
λ
)
∑
j
exp
( ri
pi−i (aj)
λ
) .
The softmax can be rewritten as follows:
exp
( ri
pi−i (ai)
λ
)
∑
j
exp
( ri
pi−i (aj)
λ
) = arg max
pi
[〈pi, ripi−i〉+ λhi(pi)]
where the function hi is the entropy.
Quantal response equilibrium can then be rewritten as:
max
pi
[〈pi, ripi−i〉+ λhi(pi)] = 〈pii, ripi−i〉+ λhi(pii).
We use the following shorthand notation for the Fenchel conjugate of h: h∗(y) = max
p
[〈p, y〉+ h(p)].
Note that h∗(y) = 〈p∗, y〉+h(p∗) where p∗ = arg max
p
[〈p, y〉+ h(p)] and so therefore, dh∗(y)dy = p∗.
This property is used in proving the regret minimizing property of CSFP below.
Additionally, a softmax can be interpreted in a probabilistic way :
P
(
a = arg max
ai
ripi−i(a
i)
λ
+ i
)
where i follow a Gumbel distribution (µ = 0 and β = 1 see the original paper on SFP [36]).
H.1 Fictitious Play
We first recap known results of Discrete Time Fictitious Play and continuous time Fictitious Play.
Discrete Time Fictitious Play: Discrete Time Fictitious Play [93] is probably the oldest algo-
rithm to learn a Nash equilibrium in a zero-sum two-player game. The convergence rate is
O
(
t
− 1|A0|+|A1|−2
)
[103] and it has been conjectured in [55] that the actual rate of convergence
of discrete time Fictitious Play is O(t−
1
2 ) (which matches [103]’s lower bound in the 2 action case).
A strong form of this conjecture has been disproved in [24].
However Discrete Time Fictitious Play (sometimes referred to as Follow the Leader) is not a regret
minimizing algorithm in the worst case (see a counter example in [27]). A solution to this problem is
to add a regularization term in the best response to get the regret minimizing property (i.e. a Follow
the Regularized Leader algorithm).
Continuous time Fictitious Play: The integral version of continuous time FP (CFP) is:
piit =
1
t
t∫
s=0
bisds where ∀i, bit = arg max
pi
〈
pi,
1
t
∫ t
s=0
ri
b−is
ds
〉
,
with bit being arbitrary for t < 1.
We now recap known convergence results of CFP in zero-sum two-player games, then generalize
results of the convergence to a CCE from two player [84] games to N -player games.
A straightforward Lyapunov analysis [43] shows that CFP results in a descent on the exploitability
φ(pi) =
N∑
i=1
maxpi〈pi, ripi−i〉 − ripi , i.e., ddtφ(pi) ≤ − 1tφ(pi).
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A Regret Minimizing Property: Let ris be a measurable reward stream and let the following
process be:
piit =
1
t
t∫
s=0
bisds where ∀i, bit = arg max
pi
〈
pi,
1
t
t∫
s=0
risds
〉
.
We want to prove the following regret is sub-linear: Let ris be an arbitrary measurable reward stream
(as opposed to ri
pi−is
which was the reward for a given opponent policy pi−is ):
Reg((bis)s≤t) = max
pi
t∫
s=0
〈pi, ris〉ds−
t∫
s=0
〈bis, ris〉ds
for all t ≥ 1 we have:
d
dt
max
pi
〈
pi,
t∫
s=0
risds
〉 = 〈bit, ddt
t∫
s=0
risds
〉
= 〈bit, rit〉.
We conclude by noticing that:
T∫
t=1
d
dt
max
pi
〈
pi,
t∫
s=0
risds
〉 dt = T∫
t=1
〈bit, rit〉dt =
T∫
t=0
〈bit, rit〉dt−
1∫
t=0
〈bit, rit〉dt
= max
pi
T∫
t=0
〈pi, rit〉dt−max
pi
1∫
t=0
〈pi, rit〉dt.
This implies that:
max
pi
T∫
t=0
〈pi, rit〉dt−
T∫
t=0
〈bit, rit〉dt = max
pi
1∫
t=0
〈pi, rit〉dt−
1∫
0
〈bit, rit〉dt.
Hence we have Reg((bis)s≤t) = O(1).
This implies that the average joint strategy 1T
T∫
0
btdt converges to a CCE (where bt(a1, . . . , aN ) =
b1t (a1)× · · · × bNt (aN )).
Discrete time Stochastic Fictitious Play: Discrete Time Fictitious play has been comprehensively
studied [38]. This book shows that Discrete time Stochastic Fictitious Play converges to an -CCE
(this is implied by -Hannan consistency).
Continuous time Stochastic Fictitious Play: The integral version of continuous time Stochastic
FP (CSFP) is:
piit =
1
t
t∫
0
bisds where ∀i, bit = arg max
pi
〈
pi,
1
t
∫ t
0
ri
b−is
ds+ λhi(pi)
〉
,
We now recap known convergence results of CSFP in zero-sum two-player games, then show that the
sequences of stochastic best responses converge to an -CCE.
CSFP in two-player zero-sum games:
CSFP converges to a quantal best response equilibrium and φλ(pi) =
N=2∑
i=1
maxpi〈pi, ripi−i +
λhi(pi)〉 − [ripi + λhi(pii)] =
N=2∑
i=1
maxpi〈pi, ripi−i + λhi(pi)〉 − λhi(pii) is a Lyapunov function of
the CFP dynamical system [47].
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A regret minimizing property in CSFP: We now present a regret minimization property for CSFP
in many-player games, which we use to show convergence to an -CCE. Consider a stochastic best
response process:
∀i, d
dt
piit =
1
t
[
arg max
pi
[〈pi, ri
pi−it
〉+ λhi(pi)]− piit
]
.
We have the following:
d
dt
max
pi
〈pi,
1
t
t∫
s=0
risds
〉+ λhi(pi)
 = λ d
dt
max
pi
〈pi,
 1
λt
t∫
s=0
risds
〉+ hi(pi)
 (2)
= λ
d
dt
h∗i(
1
λt
t∫
s=0
risds)
dh∗i(y)
dy
dy
dt
= λ〈bit,
d
dt
 1
λt
t∫
s=0
risds
〉 = 〈bit, ddt
1
t
t∫
s=0
risds
〉
= 〈bit,
− 1
t2
t∫
s=0
risds+
1
t
rit
〉 = 1
t
〈bit, rit〉 − 〈bit,
1
t
t∫
s=0
risds
〉

=
1
t
〈bit, rit〉+ λhi(bit)− 〈bit,
1
t
t∫
s=0
risds
〉 − λhi(bit)

=
1
t
〈bit, rit〉+ λhi(bit)−max
pi
〈pi,
1
t
t∫
s=0
risds
〉+ λhi(pi)
 . (3)
Rearranging equation 2 and equation 3 and then multiplying both sides by t we find:
t
d
dt
max
pi
〈pi,
1
t
t∫
s=0
risds
〉+ λhi(pi)
+ max
pi
〈pi,
1
t
t∫
s=0
risds
〉+ λhi(pi)
 = 〈bit, rit〉+ λhi(bit).
As a result we obtain:
d
dt
max
pi
t∫
s=0
[〈pi, ris〉+ λhi(pi)] ds
=
d
dt
t
t
max
pi
t∫
s=0
[〈pi, ris〉+ λhi(pi)] ds
=
d
dt
t
t
max
pi
〈pi, t∫
s=0
risds
〉
+
t∫
s=0
λhi(pi)ds

=
d
dt
tmax
pi
〈pi, 1
t
t∫
s=0
risds
〉
+
1
t
t∫
s=0
λhi(pi)ds

=
d
dt
tmax
pi
〈pi, 1
t
t∫
s=0
risds
〉
+ λhi(pi)

= t
d
dt
max
pi
〈pi,
1
t
t∫
s=0
risds
〉+ λhi(pi)
+ [ d
dt
t
]
max
pi
〈pi,
1
t
t∫
s=0
risds
〉+ λhi(pi)

= 〈bit, rit〉+ λhi(bit).
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Hence, the following holds:∫ T
1
d
dt
[max
pi
t∫
s=0
[〈pi, ris〉+ λhi(pi)] ds]dt
=
∫ T
1
[〈bit, rit〉+ λhi(bit)]dt
=
T∫
s=0
[〈bis, ris〉+ λhi(bis)]ds−
1∫
s=0
[〈bis, ris〉+ λhi(bis)]ds.
Also, note that, by fundamental theorem of calculus,∫ T
1
d
dt
[max
pi
t∫
s=0
[〈pi, ris〉+ λhi(pi)] ds]dt
= max
pi
T∫
s=0
[〈pi, ris〉+ λhi(pi)] ds−max
pi
1∫
s=0
[〈pi, ris〉+ λhi(pi)] ds.
Finally we obtain:
max
pi
T∫
s=0
[〈pi, ris〉+ λhi(pi)] ds− T∫
s=0
[〈bis, ris〉+ λhi(bis)]ds
= max
pi
1∫
s=0
[〈pi, ris〉+ λhi(pi)] ds− 1∫
s=0
[〈bis, ris〉+ λhi(bis)]ds.
We are now ready to prove our key result.
Theorem 1. SFP converges to an -CCE.
Proof. We have the following:
max
pi
T∫
s=0
[〈pi, ris〉] ds = max
pi
T∫
s=0
[〈pi, ris〉+ λhi(pi)− λhi(pi)] ds
≤ max
pi
T∫
s=0
[〈pi, ris〉+ λhi(pi)] ds− Tλmin
pi
hi(pi).
This means that:
max
pi
T∫
s=0
[〈pi, ris〉] ds− T∫
s=0
[〈bis, ris〉]ds
≤ max
pi
T∫
s=0
[〈pi, ris〉+ λhi(pi)] ds−min
pi
T∫
s=0
λhi(pi)−
T∫
s=0
[〈bis, ris〉]ds+
T∫
s=0
[λhi(bis)− λhi(bis)]ds
≤ max
pi
T∫
s=0
[〈pi, ris〉+ λhi(pi)] ds− T∫
s=0
[〈bis, ris〉+ λhi(bis)]ds+
T∫
s=0
λhi(bis)ds− Tλmin
pi
hi(pi)
≤ max
pi
T∫
s=0
[〈pi, ris〉+ λhi(pi)] ds− T∫
s=0
[〈bis, ris〉+ λhi(bis)]ds+ Tλ[max
pi
hi(pi)−min
pi
hi(pi)].
We thus conclude that SFP converges to an -CCE with  ≤ λ[maxpi hi(pi)−minpi hi(pi)].
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I Size Estimates for the Game of Diplomacy
One if the issues that make Diplomacy a difficult AI challenge is the sheer size of the game. We
estimate the size of the game of Diplomacy based on No-Press games in the human dataset [86]. This
dataset consists of 21,831 games. We play through each game, and inspect how many legal actions
were available for each player at each turn of the game.
Some of the games in the dataset are unusually short, with a draw agreed after only a couple of turns.
This is usually done to cancel a game on websites without the functionality to do so. We do not
attempt to filter such games from our data, resulting in us underestimating the size of the game.
I.1 Legal Joint Actions per Turn
Diplomacy turns are one of three phases: the movement (or Diplomacy) phase, the retreats phase and
the adjustments phase. The majority of gameplay is in the movement phase, while the retreats and
adjustments phases mostly handle the effects of the movement phase. So we consider the size of this
movement phase.
In the first turn of diplomacy, there are 22 units on the board, 3 for most players and 4 for Russia.
Each unit has approximately 10 legal actions, which can be selected independently of one another.
The total number of possibilities for this first turn is 1022.3.
As the game progresses, the number of units on the board increases to a maximum of 34. Additionally,
when units are closer together, there are more opportunities to play support moves and as a result the
number of legal actions per unit grows. The largest movements phase in our data had a total of 1064.3
legal action combinations across the 7 players. The median number of possibilities in movement
phases is 1045.8.
Many of these different combinations of actions lead to the same states, for example the action
MAR support PAR→ BUR has no affect on the adjudication if the owner of the unit is Paris doesn’t
take the action PAR→ BUR, or if the movement to BUR is unopposed, or if another unit moves to
MAR, cutting the support.
I.2 Estimate of the Game Tree Size
We estimate the size of the game tree from a single game by considering the product of the number of
legal actions available at each turn of the game. For example, for a game where there were 4 options
on the first turn, 2 options on the second, 3 on the third, we estimate the size as 4× 2× 3 = 12. The
median size was 10896.8.
Note that as Diplomacy has no repetition rule or turn limit, the game tree is technically infinite.
The purpose of our estimate is to give a rough sense of the number of possibilities the agents must
consider in any given game. We report the median as the arithmetic mean is dominated by the largest
value, 107478, which comes from an exceptionally long game (that game lasted 157 movement phases,
whereas the median game length was 20 movement phases). When long games are truncated to
include only their first 20 movement phases, the median size is 10867.8, and the maximum is 101006.7.
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